An Overdue Post

Mea culpa, mea culpa, mea maxima culpa. (Man, I bet my Latin-speaking, old-time Catholic mother is proud right now.)

I abjectly apologize for not only failing to post anything for a long, long time, but for also failing to post anything that explained why I would be MIA. My bad. Without further ado, a few catch up thoughts:

• Me and the family were in Disney World for more than a week, and thoroughly enjoyed the experience, as you would expect. It was hot as blazes, really humid, it rained every afternoon from 2:30 to 4:00, the lines were long and everything you bought cost at least 50% more than it should have, and were had a blast anyway. The experience of seeing your kids' faces when they enter the Magic Kingdom, or when they meet Snow White, or get off their first roller coaster that goes upside down is worth every stinkin' penny.


• One of the days we were there, we drove over to Tampa-St. Pete to catch a Red Sox/Devil Rays game. It's my second dome, and I'll say this; they try hard. There's a great scoreboard with great information provided on it, the sound system is outstanding, the seats were pretty inexpensive, and the views were outstanding. And I still hated it. Playing a baseball game indoors just plain sucks.


• One other note; the parking situation at Tropicana Field is the worst I've ever experienced at a major league stadium. We got to the freeway exit for the stadium, with the dome in plain site about 200 yards away, at about 5:45 for a 7:10 game. We barely got to our seats in time to see the first pitch. That's nearly an hour and a half from highway exit to seat, for those of you counting. With a decent opponent in town, the Trop's few parking lots filled up quickly, and not being quite far enough into the downtown area to have other parking facilities close by, people were stuffing their cars into any space they could find. I followed a line of cars into an empty field about a mile from the stadium that was used, at least in part, by homeless people who sheltered themselves under the one available tree. That's where we parked, and that's where we had to go to get our car after the game, in a dark, somewhat industrial area of St. Petersburg. In the rain. Wake up, St. Petersburg. If you're going to force people to watch baseball indoors, and you don't have a decent public transportation system to allow people to ride instead of drive, then the least you could do is spring for sufficient parking. As it is, you're sending the clear message that you never expect to draw more than 20,000 fans on a regular basis, because you've clearly made no plans to handle the traffic.


• On a note far more in keeping with the intent of this site, I was very pleased to see the changes to the voting process for the Veterans' Committee that were outlined by the Hall of Fame. Not only did they separate the voting process for managers, executives, umpires and the like, a step that was long overdue and may finally result in some worthy inductions from those groups, but they weakened the power of the BBWAA in the process. Those groups will now be screened by a committee consisting mostly of Hall of Fame members, executives and historians, with only a few veteran writers involved. On top of that, the veteran players on the ballot will not only be fewer, creating a greater chance for a 75% majority necessary for election, but the voting will only be done by Hall of Fame players, specifically excluding the Ford Frick and J.G. Taylor Spink award winners who used to be part of the process. In other words, no more BBWAA doing the voting. A BBWAA-appointed overview committee will still be determining most of the ballot, but now a committee of six Hall of Fame players will appoint five others to the ballot. Overall, these changes lessen the power of the BBWAA, always a good thing, while making it more likely that deserving players, executives, umpires and the like will finally be elected. Sounds like a win-win to me. Kudos to the Hall of Fame for taking action.

That's it for now. I'm currently working on a more in-depth analysis of voting patterns on the Hall of Fame ballots. A cursory look at a half-dozen ballots from the early 1980s leads me to believe that there are some severe, documentable biases in the BBWAA's voting patterns, as hinted at in my last post. It's a somewhat tedious process to get all of the data into a format that lends itself to detailed analysis, so please be patient. I believe the results will be well worth the wait.

Injustice: How the BBWAA Screwed Alan Trammell

“Injustice - An act that inflicts undeserved hurt. Any act that involves unfairness to another or violation of one's rights”.

- Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary

The full definition of injustice mentions rights, and laws, and issues far more weighty than baseball, and rightly so. It’s a heavy word, not one to be wantonly thrown around in a world where it can be applied far too frequently. If you can find a synonym for “injustice lite”, I’m all ears.

Lacking that, there really isn’t any other word that applies to how Alan Trammell has been treated by the Baseball Writers Association of America. Unless, of course, you go vulgar and say he’s been screwed. That works for me.

What makes Trammell’s case particularly troubling is that the BBWAA has inflicted a double whammy on him. He is currently eligible for election into the Hall of Fame, but has burned through six years of eligibility without cracking 100 votes in any election, or collecting even 20% of the votes cast. For a variety of generally unknown but surely moronic reasons, the BBWAA doesn’t seem to think that Alan Trammell belongs in the Hall of Fame. One of those, sadly and ironically, involves the double whammy I mentioned. Specifically, Trammell’s lack of an MVP award on his resume is seen as a negative, despite the fact that he very much deserved one and it was yet another BBWAA foul-up that denied it to him.

Let’s deal with the MVP issue first. Here are the top-10 vote-getters for the 1987 American League MVP, along with their WARP3 Scores for that season and their team’s win total:

George Bell - 9.2; 96
Alan Trammell - 13.2; 98
Kirby Puckett - 7.6; 85
Dwight Evans - 7.8; 78
Paul Molitor - 8.3; 91
Mark McGwire - 9.0; 81
Don Mattingly - 9.1; 89
Tony Fernandez - 10.1; 98
Wade Boggs - 13.1; 78
Gary Gaetti - 5.0; 85

What’s that old Sesame Street song? “One of these things is not like the others, one of these things does not belong…” You can say that again, Big Bird.

It doesn’t take a brain surgeon, or someone who cares all that much about the so-called “modern” baseball statistics that have become popular, to recognize that Alan Trammell was the best player in the American League in 1987. Forget WARP for a minute and note simply that Bell and Trammell had nearly identical OPS marks (.957 for Bell, .953 for Trammell), meaning they had essentially the same value as hitters even before you consider Trammell’s obvious plusses, like the fact that he posted his offensive numbers in a Tiger Stadium that suppressed scoring by 4% that year while Bell played in an Exhibition Stadium that increased scoring by 2%, meaning that their respective OPS+ marks clearly favor Trammell (155 to 146). Using the most basic formula around for Runs Created, Trammell scores higher than Bell, 133 to 129. What this means is that a team comprised of all Alan Trammell’s could expect to score 8.7 runs per game in 1987, while a team of all George Bell’s would score 7.8, nearly a full run less. And then there’s the little fact that Trammell was, you know, a shortstop, and a pretty good one (106 Rate, 8 FRAA) while George Bell was just an average left fielder (101 Rate, 1 FRAA).

Or how about the fact that Trammell was infinitely better than Bell in September and October as their two teams battled each other to the last day of the season for the division title? Bell was no slouch in those final weeks of the season (.308/.379/.530/.909), but those marks were distinctly lower than his performance for the rest of the year, and they paled in comparison to Trammell (.417/.490/.677/1.167). Read that last stat line again. Alan Trammell, a shortstop, batted .417 and slugged .677 from September 1st through the end of the season in 1987. That stretch included seven games head-to-head against Bell’s Blue Jays, games in which Trammell also hit .417, while slugging .667. Not surprisingly, the Tigers won four of those seven games, including 3-game sweep on the season’s final weekend, to win the division by two games. For the year, Trammell hit .340/ .446/ .723/ 1.169 against Toronto, while Bell hit just .294/ .379/ .431/ .810 against Detroit. Every single so-called “clutch” stat went on favor of Trammell:

2 outs, runners in scoring position: Trammell - .937 OPS; Bell - .832 OPS
Late & Close situations: Trammell – 1.087 OPS; Bell - .951 OPS
Game Tied: Trammell – 1.012 OPS; Bell - .894 OPS

I’ll stop there before I get into severe overkill range. By now it should be obvious to anyone who follows baseball that Alan Trammell out-classed George Bell by a long, long way in 1987. The only player in the league who came close to Trammell’s performance was Wade Boggs, and he played for a team with a losing record, one that finished 20 games behind Trammell’s Tigers.

And yet, thought the voting was close, Trammell was denied the MVP. Only a voting body as screwed up as the BBWAA could fail to give the MVP to the league’s best player when he also happened to play on the league’s best team.

Okay, that’s bad. It’s unfair, or unjust, if you will. Trammell deserved better, and most people who study the game will gladly tell you so. But the BBWAA didn’t stop there. No, they decided to compound their mistake by holding it against Trammell now that he’s eligible for the Hall of Fame. Think for a second; how many players have won the MVP as a shortstop? Damn few. In fact, here’s the entire list:

2003 - Alex Rodriguez
2002 - Miguel Tejada
1995 - Barry Larkin
1991 - Cal Ripken (HOF)
1983 - Cal Ripken (HOF)
1982 - Robin Yount (HOF)
1965 - Zoilo Versalles
1962 - Maury Wills
1960 - Dick Groat
1959 - Ernie Banks (HOF)
1958 - Ernie Banks (HOF)
1950 - Phil Rizzuto (HOF)
1948 - Lou Boudreau (HOF)
1944 - Marty Marion
1925 - Roger Peckinpaugh

That’s it. Just fifteen awards to thirteen players in the history of the award. Of those thirteen, five are already in the Hall of Fame, one certainly will be (ARod), two others will have great cases once they’re eligible (Tejada and Larkin), and two have been proposed as serious candidates for decades (Wills and Marion). Only three shortstops have won an MVP and really don’t have any case for being in Cooperstown, and those three, frankly, either had the fluke year to end all fluke years (Versalles), or just plain didn’t deserve their awards (Groat, who didn’t even have the best WARP3 score on the Pirates, and Peckinpaugh, whose 4.1 WARP3 score was 11th on the 1925 Washington Senators. You may want to read that again.)

In short, a shortstop who wins the MVP has a 50/50 or better chance of being elected to the Hall of Fame, and an even greater chance, something like 80% of receiving considerable support for election. Consider Marty Marion next to Trammell, for instance:

Games – Trammell, 2293; Marion, 1572
At-Bats – Trammell, 8288; Marion, 5506
Runs – Trammell, 1273; Marion, 602
Hits – Trammell, 2365; Marion, 1448
Doubles – Trammell, 412; Marion, 272
Triples – Trammell, 55; Marion, 37
Home Runs – Trammell, 185; Marion, 36
RBI – Trammell, 1003; Marion, 624
Steals – Trammell, 236; Marion, 35
Walks – Trammell, 850; Marion, 470
Batting Average – Trammell, .285; Marion, .263
On-Base Percentage – Trammell, .352; Marion, .323
Slugging Percentage – Trammell, .415; Marion, .345
OPS+ - Trammell, 110; Marion, 81

While it’s fair to note that Marion was an outstanding defender, much better than Trammell, who was good himself, the gap in their offensive abilities and longevity is just too enormous. (And no, Marion doesn’t get any missing wars years as credit. He played throughout all of the WWII years, with his MVP coming in one of them, 1944.) Trammell obviously had the better career. And yet…

Highest HOF Percentage – Marion, 40%; Trammell, 18%

All together now…huh? Are you beginning to sense my frustration? Just wait, I’m not done yet. Check out Trammell against Maury Wills:

Games – Trammell, 2293; Wills, 1942
At-Bats – Trammell, 8288; Wills, 7588
Runs – Trammell, 1273; Wills, 1067
Hits – Trammell, 2365; Wills, 2134
Doubles – Trammell, 412; Wills, 177
Triples – Trammell, 55; Wills, 71
Home Runs – Trammell, 185; Wills, 20
RBI – Trammell, 1003; Wills, 458
Steals – Trammell, 236; Wills, 586
Walks – Trammell, 850; Wills, 552
Batting Average – Trammell, .285; Wills, .281
On-Base Percentage – Trammell, .352; Wills, .330
Slugging Percentage – Trammell, .415; Wills, .331
OPS+ - Trammell, 110; Wills, 88

A few differences, like the fact that Wills was a much better baserunner/stolen base guru than either Trammell or Marion. Plus Wills played in Dodger Stadium in the 1960s, one of the more inhospitable places for a hitter in all of baseball. Still, he had no power, didn’t draw walks, didn’t play terribly long and was a really mediocre defensive shortstop most years (101 Rate, 15 FRAA). So, once the differences are taken as a whole, it’s still really clear that Trammell had the better career. Clear to everyone but the BBWAA that is…

Highest HOF Percentage – Wills, 41%; Trammell, 18%

I’m beginning to see a pattern. Apparently that MVP award carried a lot more weight than it should, to the point of providing significant boosts to the Hall of Fame vote totals of most of the shortstops who received one. Hell, the BBWAA went so far as to list both Marion (68.8 career WARP3) and Wills (81.6) on the Veterans’ Committee ballot, apparently under the delusion that each is one of the top-25 veteran players not currently in the Hall of Fame. They were deemed more worthy than Bill Dahlen (135.1) and Jack Glasscock (107.2) and Stan Hack (104.1) and Dick Bartell (103.7) and Rusty Staub (101.9) and Bert Campaneris (98.6) and Bob Johnson (98.1) and Lave Cross (97.9) and Bob Elliott (97.1) and Billy Pierce (93.7) and Jimmy Wynn (92.7) and Jimmy Ryan (92.1) and Heinie Groh (91.8) and Ken Singleton (90.2) and Norm Cash (89.7) and Reggie Smith (89.5) and Willie Davis (89.3) and Sherry Magee (87.1) and Jake Daubert (81.6) and Buddy Myer (81.6) and Sal Bando (81.1). I’m sure there are others I’m missing, but hey, why should I knock myself out researching guys who the BBWAA has clearly forgotten?

While guys like Marion and Wills apparently enjoy vastly better reputations than they deserve, Trammell is getting little HOF support despite the fact that he more than measures up to the Hall’s and BBWAA’s standards for shortstops. This isn’t some borderline case of a guy who might be a touch better than the two or three worst guys in the Hall of Fame. Trammell could actually raise the standard in some regards. At worst, he’s an average Hall of Fame shortstop. Once all of the numbers are neutralized to account for different run-scoring eras and home ballparks, here are the average career offensive numbers for a Hall of Fame shortstop, along with Alan Trammell’s:

Games – HOF, 2338; Trammell, 2385
At-Bats – HOF, 8809; Trammell, 8769
Runs – HOF, 1349; Trammell, 1395
Hits – HOF, 2543; Trammell, 2595
Doubles – HOF, 428; Trammell, 453
Triples – HOF, 116; Trammell, 57
Home Runs – HOF, 120; Trammell, 199
RBI – HOF, 1160; Trammell, 1130
Walks – HOF, 891; Trammell, 939
Steals – HOF, 291; Trammell, 255
Batting Average – HOF, .289; Trammell, .296
On-Base Percentage – HOF, .358; Trammell, .364
Slugging Percentage – HOF, .403; Trammell, .429

Don’t look now, but it would appear that Alan Trammell’s career would be a very fine fit among Hall of Fame shortstops. Not that the BBWAA cares. To them, he’s apparently missing that one extra thing, the thing that would make him stand out.

That thing they screwed him out of in 1987.

The Santo Debacle

Hearken back to late February, if you will. The groundhog had failed to see his shadow a few weeks earlier, supposedly an omen that an early spring would find us this year. Pitchers and catchers had been in camp for 10 days or so. Manny Ramirez showed up early, sporting a few red dreadlocks and doing Manny things once more. There was labor peace, and the various clubs around baseball were fat with cash. Even the dregs of the sport looked upon the upcoming season with hope.

And yet, a dark day found its way into the lives of true baseball fans nonetheless.

The Veterans' Committee had spoken.

Ron Santo wouldn't be getting the call. Again.

I will not re-hash yet again the details of the Veterans Committee's idiotic balloting system. I've killed enough brain cells on that one, thank you very much. But I would like to spend a few moments today in debunking one foolish myth put forth by several BBWAA members after this year's VC voting results were announced.

That is, of course, the ridiculous notion that the Committee's failure to elect anyone, far from being an indictment of the system, was actually an affirmation of the quality of work the BBWAA has collectively put forth in past elections. Rather than try to explain their twisted logic, I will let one of the purveyors of this tale tell it in his own words:

"The purpose of the Veterans Committee is not to elect players but to correct oversights that might have been committed in the 15 years a player was under consideration for enshrinement by veteran members of the Baseball Writers' Association of America.

Instead of a slight to any former player, the Veterans Committee not electing any players would seem to mean the BBWAA voters did their job and elected those who belong.

Truly, who better to decide the merits of a player possibly overlooked for Hall of Fame induction than the men who played against him or with him and who are in the Hall of Fame?"

Those, ladies and gentlemen, are the words of Tracy Ringolsby, the man whose Hall of Fame voting practices I pilloried in my last post. He threw a few other nuggets into that column as well, including the claim that he respects any process that requires 75% of the voters to agree. Sadly, he omits to discuss whether or not his stance on that matter would change if the voters in question were clearly unqualified to vote in the first place.

Ringolsby was not the only BBWAA member to express this view. He was joined by

Hal Bodley, Mike Bauman and various other crotchety old farts who happily trumpeted the result as affirmation of their own worth and voting aptitude. They nearly soiled themselves in their various efforts to write the first BBWAA version of Sally Field’s infamous “You really like me!” speech.

All of this self-congratulation made me slightly ill, particularly since I didn’t find a single column by a BBWAA member that stated the obvious alternate conclusion, namely that the continued exclusion of Ron Santo from the Hall of Fame is proof positive that the BBWAA is a failure as a voting body.

I’ll get into Santo’s qualifications in a minute, but first let’s state the obvious. Once all non-voters are considered, people like historians, sabermetricians, the general public, etc., the overwhelming majority of baseball fans consider Ron Santo to be a Hall of Famer, yet he isn’t because two extremely small, non-representative groups don’t agree with that view and happen to be the parties who control admission. That simply has to be somewhat embarrassing for the sport, doesn’t it? When the sport’s most hallowed honor is denied to someone that the majority of fans and baseball researchers feel is qualified, it lessens the meaning of the award. Why bother having it if it isn’t awarded to the people who deserve it?

Without getting into all of the performance metrics that prove, to anyone with a rational brain in their head, that Santo is abundantly qualified for induction, let me instead make just a couple of comparisons that illustrate how foolishly inconsistent the BBWAA’s stance is in this case.

When Ron Santo first appeared on the ballot in 1980, here is how he ranked among all Hall-eligible third basemen in the history of the sport:

Games: 2nd
Hits: 5th
Home Runs: 2nd
RBI: 2nd
Runs: 7th
Extra-Base Hits: 2nd
OPS: 2nd
Runs Created: 2nd
Slugging: 2nd
Total Bases: 2nd
Walks: 4th

Now, combine that with his 5 Gold Gloves, and it’s really, really difficult to make a case for leaving Santo out of the Hall of Fame. But let’s say, just for a moment, that the BBWAA was correct in passing him over. Let’s say that the standards should be so high that someone who ranked in similar fashion to Santo at his position should be kept out of the Hall. In that case, I wish some BBWAA member would tell me why Jimmie Foxx was elected:

Foxx’s ranks at 1st base in 1980 (Santo’s first year on the ballot):
Games: 5th
Hits: 5th
Home Runs: 2nd
RBI: 2nd
Runs: 2nd
Extra-Base Hits: 2nd
OPS: 2nd
Runs Created: 3rd
Slugging: 2nd
Total Bases: 2nd
Walks: 3rd

Hmmm. Looks pretty much the same, doesn’t it? In other words, Ron Santo ranked among third baseman almost exactly the same as Jimmie Foxx ranked among Hall-eligible first basemen.

This is not an isolated case. For instance, here’s a second baseman with similar credentials:

Charlie Gehringer’s ranks at 2nd base in 1980 (Santo’s first year on the ballot):
Games: 4th
Hits: 5th
Home Runs: 5th
RBI: 3rd
Runs: 2nd
Extra-Base Hits: 2nd
OPS: 2nd
Runs Created: 4th
Slugging: 2nd
Total Bases: 4th
Walks: 2nd

If anything, Gehringer’s ranks among his peers were actually a touch worse than Santo’s. Then there’s a certain shortstop…

Joe Cronin’s ranks at shortstops in 1980 (Santo’s first year on the ballot):
Games: 10th
Hits: 8th
Home Runs: 2nd
RBI: 3rd
Runs: 11th
Extra-Base Hits: 2nd
OPS: 2nd
Runs Created: 5th
Slugging: 1st
Total Bases: 3rd
Walks: 5th

…whose ranks were clearly worse than Santo’s. Or how about one of the greatest center fielders ever?

Tris Speaker’s ranks at center field in 1980 (Santo’s first year on the ballot):
Games: 3rd
Hits: 2nd
Home Runs: (Too low to mention, Dead Ball Era and all)
RBI: 3rd
Runs: 3rd
Extra-Base Hits: 3rd
OPS: 6th
Runs Created: 3rd
Slugging: 9th
Total Bases: 3rd
Walks: 3rd

I guess what I’m trying to say is this; If Tris Speaker had been on the BBWAA’s ballot in 1980 instead of Ron Santo, would Speaker have been elected? Or how about Foxx, or Cronin or Gehringer? These are the types of very fair questions the BBWAA has set itself up for by failing to elect Ron Santo, because Santo clearly stood among his peers at his position in the same light as Speaker stood among center fielders, or Foxx among first baseman, etc. Santo was, arguably, the second-best third baseman to have played the sport up to that point (with Eddie Mathews clearly having been the best). And yet, for some really, really stupid reason, the BBWAA not only didn’t elect him, but they gave him so few votes that he was dropped from the ballot.

That begs the kinds of question I just asked, plus another; Is third base somehow less important that first base? Of course not. In fact, it’s demonstrably more important given the defensive skills necessary to play there. And yet the BBWAA happily inducted Jimmie Foxx as soon as their early glut of great players was cleared enough for him, and Foxx clearly didn’t stand any better among his peers at first than Santo did among his peers at third.

On top of that, the BBWAA voted in lesser lights as well, men who clearly had no claim to being the second- or third- of tenth-best player at their position. I mean, was Willie Stargell considered one of the top three or four left fielders in the history of the sport when he was elected in 1988? That would be a hard argument to make, considering that Ted Williams and Al Simmons and Stan Musial and Billy Williams had already been elected by the BBWAA and Ed Delahanty was already enshrined as well, having never appeared on a BBWAA ballot.

Or how about Al Kaline? Was he one of the five greatest right fielders ever when he was elected on the first ballot the same year Santo first appeared, 1980? Of course not. Babe Ruth, Mel Ott, Paul Waner, Harry Heilman and Roberto Clemente were all already elected by the writers and were all arguably better, and that doesn’t even get into clearly better players like Sam Crawford who was a Veterans’ Committee selection, or Hank Aaron and Frank Robinson, who were retired at the time and just awaiting first-ballot induction.

And when we turn to Santo’s own position, third base, we find an utterly ridiculous voting pattern. Did you know that in 1980, when Ron Santo first appeared on the BBWAA ballot, they had elected the grand total of TWO third basemen to the Hall of Fame? Eddie Mathews, who clearly deserved it, and Pie Traynor, who is questionable at best. And, by 1980, the BBWAA should have known that. All they had to do was compare Traynor, who played in a prolific period for all hitters, to Santo, who played in a prolific period for all pitchers.

Pie Traynor’s ranks at third base in 1980 (Santo’s first year on the ballot):
Games: 8th
Hits: 2nd
Home Runs: (Too low to mention)
RBI: 4th
Runs: 6th
Extra-Base Hits: T-6th
OPS: 9th
Runs Created: 9th
Slugging: 10th
Total Bases: 5th
Walks: (Nowhere near the top-25)

It’s painfully obvious that Ron Santo was the better baseball player. He completely outclassed one of the only two third basemen who had been elected by the BBWAA at the time he came up for a vote, this was clear even using the most common statistics of the day, and yet he not only wasn’t elected, but was dropped from the ballot and remains on the outside looking in to this day.

The BBWAA needs to face the fact that omitting Santo will always be one of the voters’ dumbest acts. The current Veterans Committee, which, by the admission of at least one of its members, Mike Schmidt, is motivated to keep membership exclusive, has in no way validated this mistake, whether Ringolsby and his minions want to admit it or not. They can go on claiming anything they want, but that won’t make it so.

The fact is that the baseball writers effectively decided to keep the third base equivalent of Jimmie Foxx or Tris Speaker out of the Hall of Fame, and now some of them are desperately grasping at any possible excuse to make that act look like anything other than what it actually is.

A mistake.

Case Study - Tracy Ringolsby

Okay, enough playing nice. Time to get the muscles working again by dissecting another flawed Hall of Fame voter. Today's selection: former BBWAA president and 2005 recipient of the J.G. Taylor Spink Award, Tracy Ringolsby of The Rocky Mountain News. That's right; we're taking on a Hall of Famer. Hey, just because he has credentials as a writer doesn't mean he's got credentials as a voter.

I decided to target Ringolsby after reading his take on the outcome of the Veterans' Committee voting earlier this year. In short, Ringolsby is one of those guys who feels that the VC's failure to elect anyone validates the past work of the BBWAA. Clearly, according to Ringolsby, the BBWAA must have been doing a stellar job if the Veterans couldn't find a single player worthy of election.

That, my friends, is what I call a crock of crap.

Look, I'm sure Tracy Ringolsby is a nice man who works hard at his job as a writer and puts honest effort into his Hall of Fame ballots. I don't get the sense that he exercises personal vendettas against players he didn't like, and I greatly admire the fact that he has chosen to remain a beat writer and attend games in person on a regular basis. Baseball is clearly his sport, and it's nice that he recognizes that.

That said, I think he's pretty much the poster child for why writers shouldn't be allowed to vote. The fact that his fellow voters not only don't agree with that sentiment, but consider him such a model of sports writing and Hall of Fame voting to elect him president of their association AND elect him to the Hall of Fame, tells me that the BBWAA, collectively, doesn't know a damned thing.

In the future, there will be a post about exactly how moronic it is to argue that the Veterans Committee’s recent actions validate the BBWAA’s past results. For now, let’s look at Ringolsby himself. Here are a few direct quotes from Ringolsby about some of his past voting practices, followed by a bit of commentary from me on each.


"I feel (Dave) Concepcion was a dominant player at his position in his time, very underrated for intangibles…"

Ringolsby must have a funny definition of "dominant". Looking at a 30-year period, from 1965 through 1994, which encompasses Concepcion’s entire career plus a few extra seasons before and after he played, Concepcion just doesn't have any kind of case for being the "dominant" shortstop in his time. For example, he didn't lead his position in, well, anything. There is not one positive offensive statistic in which Dave Concepcion was at the top of the list of all the shortstops who played in his era.

The one thing he did better than anyone else was just stay on the field. He played a lot of games, 2488, to be exact, more than any other pure shortstop of this time period, trailing only Robin Yount among players who were classified as shortstops for their careers. And all of those games did, in fact, let him rack up lots of counting numbers. Among his shortstop peers, he was third in hits and fourth in several categories, including doubles, extra base hits, RBI, stolen bases, and total bases.

But it should also be noted that despite playing the most games of any shortstop of this era, Concepcion was just 9th in home runs, 7th in walks, 6th in runs, 5th in runs created, and tied for 15th in triples. His career batting average was worse than eight other shortstops of this period, including Rick Burleson and Garry Templeton and Tony Fernandez. His career on-base percentage was 16th, trailing such offensive juggernauts as Ivan DeJesus, Spike Owen, Chris Speier, and Bud Harrelson. His career slugging percentage of .357 was twelfth, behind world-famous boppers like Burleson, Templeton and Leo Cardenas. His OPS was .679, good for just tenth among his peers. Rico Petrocelli’s was better. So were Roy Smalley’s and Jim Fregosi’s.

What’s more, while Concepcion was an outstanding fielder (6 Gold Gloves, 107 career Rate and 134 career Fielding Runs Above Average according to Baseball Prospectus), he wasn’t the dominant defensive shortstop of his day. That would be Ozzie Smith, who won all 13 of his Gold Gloves in this time period, including nine while Concepcion was still active, and had better career Rate (111) and Fielding Runs Above Average (270) scores. Heck, Mark Belanger has similar defensive stats during this era (8 Gold Gloves, 107 Rate, 112 RAA) and I don’t see anyone calling his defense “dominant”. The same could be said for Tony Fernandez (4 Gold Gloves, 108 Rate, 119 RAA).

Sorry, but "dominant" just doesn’t apply. Great fielder, good clubhouse guy, a winner in the post-season. All true. But "dominant"? Puh-lease.


"A left-handed hitter at Fenway Park probably has as much a stat edge as any hitter at Coors Field."

This came up in the context of Ringolsby explaining why he didn’t rate Wade Boggs as highly as most voters. More on that in a moment, but for now let’s explore just this statement by itself. Maybe this is the Cheyenne-born and -bred Ringolsby’s “homer” moment, born of a love of all things in the Mountain Time Zone, but what a dumb statement.

Let’s start with the obvious fact that Coors Field is widely considered the most hitter-friendly ballpark in history. It has been open for 13 years, and has never had a park factor for hitters lower than 107 and has been as high as 131. It has averaged a park factor of 120, which means that the park boosts offense in general by 20%. For Wade Boggs’ 11 seasons in Boston, Fenway Park never had a park factor higher than 107 for a full season. The average was 105, so already we see that for Ringolsby’s statement to be true there has to be a massive difference between how Fenway plays for righties versus lefties.

Thankfully, studies on this subject exist. One analysis of Fenway from 1992-2001 showed that while lefties’ batting averages surged by 8% in Fenway, their home run numbers suffered by a much larger amount, about 14% on average. So while Fenway might help with a lefty’s total number of hits, it will sap his slugging percentage by a great deal. In an article earlier this year on the Baseball Prospectus web site, the following was noted: “Fenway rates as a 903 for left-handed power (with 1000 being average); Only AT&T Park has a lower score.” This was confirmed in The Bill James Handbook 2007, where it was noted that during the 2006 season, lefties’ batting averages are helped 5% in Fenway, but their home run power is reduced by 31%.

So, in essence, while lefties do have some advantages in Fenway Park, notably in their batting average and in the number of doubles they hit, they come nowhere close to the average advantage gained by hitters in Coors Field. And that’s before we account for Fenway’s tendency to sap left-handers’ home run power. In other words, Ringolsby couldn’t be more wrong.


"I don't think of Boggs among the dominant players at his position during his era, much less all time."

Before getting into Ringolsby’s iffy definition of “dominant” again, let’s address Boggs specifically when it comes to the Fenway Park factor discussed above. There is no doubt that Wade Boggs was greatly helped by Fenway Park. Not being a power hitter, the disadvantages of being a lefty in Fenway largely didn’t affect him, while he was better able than most to take advantage of Fenway’s benefits. For his career, Boggs stat line in Fenway was .369/.464/.527, compared to .306/.388/.398 everywhere else. Clearly, he loved the Fens.

Now, let’s note exactly what that means. It means that Wade Boggs was a .300 hitter even when he didn’t play in Fenway Park. It means that if you extrapolate his non-Fenway numbers out to the full length of his career (2440 games), you still have a player with 2826 hits (44th all-time, between Charlie Gehringer and George Sisler), 1383 runs (tied for 85th all-time with Tony Gwynn), 440 doubles (tied with Roberto Clemente, among others, for 92nd all-time), 1289 walks (38th all-time, ahead of Al Kaline, Ty Cobb, Dave Winfield, Cal Ripken and a host of other Hall of Famers), a .306 average and .388 on-base percentage. His career OPS would have been .786 at a time when the normalized league average was .750, and that’s without the benefit of playing a single home game.

He would still have a pair of Gold Gloves, would still have a slew of All-Star appearances and would still have a World Championship ring. In his Fenway seasons, here is how some of his road batting averages would have finished in the league standings:

1982 – 1st
1983 – 2nd
1985 – 3rd
1986 – 1st
1988 – 2nd

Gee, “only” two batting titles to go along with three other top-3 finishes. What a sham. He also still would have led the league in on-base percentage twice, with several other top-10 finishes. And, again, this would be on the presumption that he played every single game on the road.

I think it’s pretty clear that if Wade Boggs had never set foot in Fenway Park, his career numbers still would have been worthy of Hall of Fame consideration. At the time of his election, the average third baseman in the Hall of Fame had played 2097 games, with 2289 hits, 1192 runs, 404 doubles, 227 homers, 1210 RBI, 804 walks, a .292 batting average, .359 on-base percentage, .455 slugging percentage and .814 OPS. With the exception of the power numbers, Boggs comfortably exceeds all of those figures. And that brings us to Ringolsby’s next point.


"Boggs was a corner infielder. For him to be dominant, in my opinion -- and it's just my opinion -- he had to be a power guy."

So, in Tracy Ringolsby’s world, only third basemen with power numbers provide enough value to be serious Hall of Fame candidates. Without that, their case is fatally flawed.

This is exactly the kind of thinking that kept Boggs in the minor leagues for so long to begin with. He didn’t fit the stereotype for bashing hot corner players, so the Red Sox didn’t give him any regular playing time until he was 25-years old, despite massive minor league success. In Boggs’ last five minor league seasons, these were his on-base percentages - .424, .403, .422, .401, .438, and these were his batting averages - .332, .311, .325, .306, .335. By the way, the last two of those seasons were full years in Triple A, so I’m not sure where else they expected him to prove he wasn’t a fluke. It could fairly be argued that the Red Sox cost Boggs another 200-300 hits for his career by not calling him up and giving him the third base job when he was clearly ready to play.

But Ringolsby apparently agrees with this logic, feeling that Boggs had the fatal flaw of not having home run power, making him a poor man’s third baseman. According to Ringolsby, these namby-pamby on-base guys can only be afforded at third base if the team is getting power from an unexpected source, like catcher, shortstop or center field. Of course, he then failed to do his homework and uncover that the Red Sox were getting exactly that. In Boggs’ first year as the regular third baseman, the Red Sox got 36 homers out of their center fielder, Tony Armas. They got 43 from Armas the next season, along with 24 from their catcher, Rich Gedman. This was a regular trend. During Boggs’ 11 seasons in Boston, here’s how the team finished in slugging percentage each year:

1982 – 7th
1983 – 7th
1984 – 1st
1985 – 2nd
1986 – 7th
1987 – 3rd
1988 – 2nd
1989 – 1st
1990 – 3rd
1991 – 4th
1992 – 13th, after which the club promptly dumped Boggs.

Gee, that no-power third baseman really sapped the club’s power numbers, didn’t he?

See, it’s this kind of crap I find so irritating about Ringolsby and voters like him. They take a stance on a player, based on some personal set of criteria, and then they never both to check whether those criteria are valid. According to Ringolsby, Boggs didn’t get his Hall of Fame vote because he was a creature of Fenway and didn’t provide enough power for a “power” position. And yet the actual facts, had he bothered to look them up, would have pointed to Boggs having Hall-worthy numbers even if he never played a game in Fenway Park and would have shown that the last thing the Red Sox were lacking during Boggs’ playing days was power.

In other words, he’s just plain wrong, but he’d rather blindly stick to his silly personal criteria than actually give his role of Hall of Fame voter the work and respect that it deserves.


“I never felt Boggs was a threat in game situations, much like Rod Carew, and I'm sure this will be another black mark against me, but I didn't vote for Carew either.”

You’re right Tracy, that is another black mark against you. How can anyone who knows anything about baseball claim that Rod Carew wasn’t a “threat in game situations”? In exactly what kind of situations was Carew somehow not threatening? Here’s a few. I wonder if they meet Ringolsby’s criteria for “game situations”:

• Being a lefty, I can envision opposing managers regularly bringing in a left-handed pitcher to face Carew when they needed an out. Carew hit .310 against lefties for his career. Maybe that isn’t threatening enough for Ringolsby.


• On the road, where clubs typically have a harder time scoring, Carew’s career numbers were .323/.385/.425.


• In September and October, when the games typically have more meaning, Carew’s career numbers were .318/.384/.410.


• When leading off an inning, an obviously key game situation, one in which Carew could have been particularly useful given his speed, his career numbers were .319/.381/.430.


• With runners in scoring position, perhaps the very “game situation” Ringolsby was referring to, Carew was an obvious threat, posting career stats of .339/.428/.438.


• With the bases loaded, a pretty critical game situation, Carew was even better, .366/.382/.546.


• With two outs in an inning, again, an obviously critical game situation, Carew’s career line was .318/.396/.409.


• Regardless of the score, Carew was eerily consistent in his success. When the score was within 4 runs either way, Carew hit .328/.393/.427. Within three runs he hit .325/.392/.423. Within two runs, .327/.394/.426. Within one run, .322/.391/.420. When the score was tied, he hit .323/.391/.417.


• With two outs and runners in scoring position, perhaps the most critical, clutch “game situation” a player can face, Carew hit .310/.427/.394.


• In extra innings, Carew hit .333/.441/.438.


• Versus relief pitchers, who are specifically sent in to retire people like Rod Carew, he hit .332/.410/.424.


• In 1969, when the Twins won the AL West crown, their primary competition was Oakland. Carew hit .329/.365/.543 against Oakland that season. The following year, when that beat out Oakland again for the division title, Carew hit .474/.500/.474 against the A’s.


• In 1976, when the Twins were in a pennant race with the A’s and Royals for most of the season, Carew hit .379/.453/.515 against Oakland and .367/.415/.500 against Kansas City.


• In 1979, when Carew’s Angels team won the AL West title by just three games over the three-time defending division champion Royals, he hit .348/.483/.391 against Kansas City.


• In 1982, when he Angels again beat out the Royals by just three games for the division title, Carew hit .333/.400/.500 versus Kansas City.
  

Maybe Ringolsby is thinking of other “game situations”, or maybe he sees the above numbers and doesn’t consider any of them “threatening”. Either way, it doesn’t speak well of his voting record to leave a man like Rod Carew off his ballot.


"Jack Morris has always been an easy choice for me. He was the pitcher that you wanted on the mound in a big game throughout his career. He had that extra sense of how to win. He didn't let big games get away from him."

Really? Jack Morris didn’t let the big games get away from him? Then, I guess Game 5 of the 1992 World Series wasn’t a big game. You remember that one, right? It was the game where Morris gave up a first inning run to put his team in a hole, only to have them tie the score an inning later. After that, he promptly put his team down again by giving up a lead-off homer to David Justice in the fourth inning. After his team picked him by tying the score in the bottom if the fourth, Morris promptly put his team down for the third and final time the very next inning. He retired the first two hitters and was one out away from getting his team to the plate in a tie ballgame when the next five guys up went single-steal-single-double-walk-grand slam.

The common story that Jack Morris was a money pitcher whose mediocre career ERA was due to him "pitching to the score”, who could turn it on and be a bulldog in big games, is just a myth. To be sure, Morris absolutely had his moments. In seven career World Series starts, he had six quality starts, with just the one 1992 game mentioned above being a bust. But it should be noted that Morris had just two quality starts in six tries in the League Championship Series. (In fact, in one of his poorer ALCS starts, Morris was soundly outpitched by Bert Blyleven. More on him in a moment.)

Morris also failed numerous times in late-season, pressure-filled pennant races. On September 25th, 1981, the Tigers woke up with a one-game lead in a tight AL East race. Morris took the mound that day and gave up eight runs to Milwaukee, the eventual division champion. His horrible outing included him surrendering four runs in the top of the first, only to see his team battle back and take a 6-5 lead into the ninth, whereupon Morris, one out away from victory, plunked Paul Molitor with a pitch and then gave up a game-winning three-run homer to Robin Yount. The Tigers lost their one-game lead and never got it back, ultimately missing the playoffs.

In 1987, with his club holding the slimmest of leads over the Toronto Blue Jays with just a couple of weeks to play, Morris turned in a series of stinkers. On September 20th, be gave up 6 runs and took the loss against Milwaukee, cutting Detroit’s lead to just a half-game. Four days later, with his club having surrendered their lead to Toronto, Morris faced the Blue Jays in Toronto with first place on the line. He walked an astounding eight hitters and after his club had taken a 2-0 lead with two runs in the top of the third, Morris promptly surrendered the lead by giving up four runs on four hits, two walks, and a wild pitch in the bottom of that inning. The Tigers couldn’t recover and lost the game, falling to 1.5 games out of first. Four days later, with his club now trailing by 2.5 games and desperate for a win, Morris took the mound against a bad Baltimore team that was just 2-17 in their previous 19 games. Morris surrendered the lead in the third inning and walked five on his way to a loss to the far-from-immortal John Habyan. In his final game of the season just five days later, after the Tigers had clawed their way back to a flat-footed tie with the Blue Jays, Morris promptly put his club behind in a head-to-head matchup with their rivals by surrendering a run in the very first inning. When his team tied the score an inning later, Morris promptly put them behind again by surrendering another run in the fifth. Though the Tigers eventually tied the score again, and hung on to win the game in twelve innings, Morris was soundly outpitched by Mike Flanagan. Morris gave up eight hits and five walks in nine innings, while striking out just six, compared to Flanagan’s yeoman 11 innings of work, with only eight hits and two walks surrendered while striking out nine. If not for Mike Henneman shutting down the Blue Jays for the final three innings, Detroit likely would have fallen a game out of first with just one to play.

The very next year, Detroit held the lead in the AL East for most of the summer, and on August 21st their record stood at 73-50, in first place by four games over Boston. The team then went 5-19 over their next 24 games, surrendering the lead and falling five games out of first. During this stretch, Morris started five games and posted an abysmal ERA of 5.57. He allowed 52 baserunners in just 32.1 innings.

Yup, a real big-game pitcher that Jack Morris. Never let those big games get away from him.

Ringolsby is guilty of a classic case of selective memory. He recalls Morris’ finer moments, like his ten-inning shutout of the Braves to clinch the 1991 World Series, and stamps him with the “big-game pitcher” label, despite the fact that there really isn’t any difference at all between Morris’ regular season stats and his “big-game” stats, and despite numerous, documented instances of Morris screwing the pooch in big games.

A little research would be a marvelous curative, but I guess Ringolsby don’t need no stinkin’ research. Nope, he’s got Jack Morris slotted for immortality, comfortably oblivious to the fact that the most similar pitcher to Morris in baseball history is Dennis Martinez.

Wins: Morris, 254; Martinez, 245
Starts: Morris, 527; Martinez, 562
Innings: Morris, 3824; Martinez, 3999.2
ERA: Morris, 3.90; Martinez, 3.70
ERA+: Morris, 104; Martinez, 106
Strikeouts: Morris, 2478; Martinez, 2149
Shutouts: Morris, 28; Martinez, 30
WHIP: Morris, 1.296; Martinez, 1.266
Post-Season ERA: Morris, 3.80; Martinez, 3.32

Hey, who knows? Maybe Ringolsby is one of the 16 voters who thought Martinez belonged in the Hall in his only year on the ballot in 2004. In fact, that wouldn’t surprise me at all.


"I felt Blyleven was a pretty darn good pitcher but never felt he was dominating or intimidating or the best in the game."

There’s that word again, “dominating”. Apparently it’s one of Ringolsby’s primary criteria when he casts his Hall of Fame votes, and he doesn’t feel that Bert Blyleven had it.

Now, keep in mind that Ringolsby admits he voted for Luis Tiant. That's Luis. Tiant. Now, I loved Luis. Wildly entertaining. Gutsy. But was Luis Tiant dominating, or intimidating, or the best in the game? Umm, let me just say "no" for all of us and move along.

Also keep in mind that Ringolsby admits he voted for Jim Kaat. Jim “No One In My Life Ever Called Me Dominating or Intimidating” Kaat. I’ve pointed out this discrepancy between Kaat and Blyleven before, but let’s do so again for the sake of clarity.

Wins: Blyleven, 287; Kaat, 283
Starts: Blyleven, 685; Kaat, 625
Complete Games: Blyleven, 242; Kaat, 180
Shutouts: Blyleven, 60; Kaat, 31
Innings: Blyleven, 4970; Kaat, 4530.1
Strikeouts: Blyleven, 3701; Kaat, 2461
ERA: Blyleven, 3.31; Kaat, 3.45
ERA+: Blyleven, 118; Kaat, 107
WHIP: Blyleven, 1.198; Kaat, 1.259
Top-10 Cy Young finishes: Blyleven, 4; Kaat, 1
Oh by the way: Blyleven, two World Series titles; Kaat, one.

For good measure, these are their respective post-season records:

Kaat: 9 games, 5 starts, 1-3, 4.01 ERA, 1.541 WHIP, 10 strikeouts in 24.2 innings
Blyleven: 8 games, 6 starts, 5-1, 2.47 ERA, 1.077 WHIP, 36 strikeouts in 47.1 innings

(Quick aside: Isn’t it funny that Jack Morris’ career post-season mark of 7-4 with an ERA of 3.80 and a WHIP of 1.245 gives him the title of “big-game pitcher”, but Blyleven’s 5-1, 2.47 ERA, 1.077 WHIP gets him nothing?)

Clearly, Blyleven had better numbers than Kaat (I’m not even going to bother with Tiant’s), and there’s no way in the world Jim Kaat fits the Ringolsby criterion of being “dominant” or “intimidating”. So, in essence, he decided to vote for an inferior pitcher for the Hall of Fame because he made one extra All-Star team during his career and won a ton of Gold Gloves. That’s neat, and I’m sure Jim Kaat is every bit the gentleman I’ve always heard, but given the insignificance of defense from the pitcher, I’m afraid I just don’t see how Ringolsby’s stance is justified.

In fact, I think that this kind of random voting pattern, where a good player doesn’t get his vote while a lesser player does, is an abuse of the voting power Ringolsby and the other writers have been granted. In a private moment, I think Tracy Ringolsby, the hardcore baseball fan and personal witness to thousands of games, would tell you that Bert Blyleven was a better pitcher than Jim Kaat. If that’s the case, then he’s abusing his voting power by not casting his vote for the player he thinks is better.

And if he doesn’t admit that Blyleven was better than Kaat, then he’s either lying (which I doubt), or he just has no clue how to evaluate the career accomplishments of baseball players.

Either way, he should have his voting privileges pulled.

Dumb and Dumber

Here’s a brief history lesson.

The Veterans Committee for the Baseball Hall of Fame has gone through numerous iterations in its long, tortured history. First it was known as The Centennial Commission, and was tasked with considering only players from the 1800s. In reality, under this name the Committee didn't induct a single player. After selecting five executives and managers in 1937 and another two in 1938, the group was re-named The Old-Timers Committee and starting loading up the Hall with players.

At first, one would think it impossible for them not to do a good job. After all, they could choose from literally every player who played all or a majority of his career during the 19th Century. Two of the first four players the Committee elected in 1939 were Cap Anson and Old Hoss Radbourne, and you won't find many, if any, baseball historians and SABR members who would disagree with those choices. Sadly, the other two players chosen were Buck Ewing and Candy Cummings, and thus began the long, mistaken-ridden path this committee would follow for the next 60-odd years.

Next week, when the Hall of Fame announces the results of this year’s Veterans Committee voting, we’ll get a glimpse of the next bend in that path, and it’s a near certainty that it won’t be for the good.

There are two primary reasons for this. First, and most obviously, is the history of the committee, which has allowed the likes of Highpockets Kelly and Tommy McCarthy to grace the halls of baseball’s greatest shrine. They’ve certainly inducted some deserving players, and in many cases the committee's poor selections were merely an attempt to follow the lead established by the BBWAA, as noted previously, but their history of electing stinkers is too prominent to ignore.

The second reason why we should have little confidence that they will elect one or more worthy souls is relatively new. In the most recent reinvention of the committee, it was decided that the ballot of candidates is completely determined by the BBWAA. That’s right; the one part of the election process that was outside the control of the writers is now managed by them.

While it’s true that the Veterans Committee that does that voting is comprised only of living members of the Hall of Fame, plus Ford C. Frick and J.G. Taylor Spink Award winners, the ballot itself is determined by the BBWAA. First, the writers appoint a Historical Overview Committee that is tasked with developing lists of 200 former players and 60 former managers, executives and umpires. The majority of that subcommittee are writers themselves. Then, with those lists complete, a screening committee consisting of 60 members of the BBWAA is selected to winnow those lists down to a final ballot. Only then do the Hall members take over and do the actual voting (and let’s not forget that the J.G. Taylor Spink winners are all BBWAA members themselves).

This is so important because the writers are using their same old shoddy methods for determining who should be on the ballot in the first place. For instance, which of these guys would you imagine is on the ballot:

	W	L	PCT	IP	H	R	ER	BB	SO	ERA	WHIP	ERA+
Pitcher A	203	132	.606	2887.6	2905	1836	1199	1155	1223	3.74	1.406	120
Pitcher B	193	128	.601	2623.0	2845	1382	1177	1040	985	4.04	1.481	117

Let me also state that Pitcher A won a world championship while Pitcher B’s teams never reached the post-season, and that Pitcher A also scores better on the infamous Bill James Hall of Fame Standards and Hall of Fame Monitor tests. On top of that, he’s still the better pitcher when we neutralize their stats as well. In fact, he’s significantly better:

	W	L	PCT	IP	H	R	ER	BB	SO	ERA	WHIP
Pitcher A	300	103	.744	3743.3	2811	1059	954	1113	1533	2.34	1.068
Pitcher B	196	117	.626	2892.0	2708	1129	1016	990	1084	3.16	1.279

Well, it’s Pitcher B, Wes Ferrell, who the BBWAA has decided to put on the Veteran’s Committee ballot, while they feel that Pitcher A, Jack Stivetts, apparently doesn’t make the cut. And before you throw out the argument that Ferrell was one of the best hitting pitchers ever, allow me to note the following:

	AB	R	H	2B	3B	HR	RBI	BB	AVG	OBP	SLG	OPS
Stivetts	1991	347	592	84	46	35	357	133	.297	.344	.438	.782
Ferrell	1176	175	329	57	12	38	208	129	.280	.351	.446	.797

See, Stivetts was none too shabby with the stick himself, hitting well enough to get regular playing time in the outfield and first base when he wasn’t pitching.

The really sad part about all of this is that Stivetts wasn’t even among the larger group of 200 players that was considered for the final ballot. The Historical Overview Committee has such a narrow overview of baseball history that they didn’t feel Stivetts was worthy of consideration by the broader screening committee. If you were to poll the ten members of the Overview Committee, my guess is that more than half of them would have never even heard of Jack Stivetts. If so, why would they choose to leave him off the eligibility list while including the following pitchers:

	W	L	PCT	IP	H	R	ER	BB	SO	ERA	WHIP	ERA+
Podres	148	116	.561	2265.0	2239	1026	025	743	1435	3.68	1.317	105
Osteen	196	195	.501	3460.3	3471	1435	1268	940	1612	3.30	1.275	104
Erskine	122	78	.610	1718.6	1637	830	763	646	981	4.00	1.328	101
Raschi	132	66	.667	1819.0	1666	828	752	727	944	3.72	1.316	105

Hmmm. Three Dodgers and a Yankee. Do I hear a "New York Bias" anyone? And I haven't even gotten into the questionable inclusion of Mel Stottlemyre, Dixie Walker, Don Newcombe, Eddie Lopat, Bobby Thomson, Bob Meusel, and a whole host of other New Yorkers on the Historical Overview Committee's list of 200.

If we give them the benefit if the doubt that there is no such bias involved, then it begs the obvious question of why some of these guys were chosen to appear on the final ballot. Jack Stivetts versus Wes Ferrell is not an isolated case. The writers have constructed a ballot that is comprised, in nearly every case, of players that aren’t as good as eligible players that were passed over. They list Roger Maris but not Jackie Jenson or Hank Sauer. They list Cecil Travis but not Johnny Pesky, and Luis Tiant but not Billy Pierce. They included Don Newcombe but not Nig Cuppy or Ray Kremer. Lefty O’Doul is on there but not Mike Donlin. How about these two:

	G	AB	R	H	2B	3B	HR	RBI	BB	AVG	OBP	SLG	OPS
Player X	1877	6679	1033	1814	297	21	390	1236	997	.272	.366	.498	.864
Player Y	1914	6716	1004	1953	269	36	420	1299	864	.291	.373	.529	.902

Player X is Rocky Colavito, and he’s on the ballot. Player Y, the better player, is not. That’s Frank Howard. Okay, these are neutralized stats, and it’s a near certainty that the guys on the committee have never once considered anything other than a player’s raw number. Context? What’s that? Even so, I don’t get why Colavito makes the cut and Howard doesn’t:

	G	AB	R	H	2B	3B	HR	RBI	BB	AVG	OBP	SLG	OPS
Colavito	1841	6503	971	1730	283	21	374	1159	951	.266	.359	.489	.848
Howard	1895	6488	864	1774	245	35	382	1119	782	.273	.352	.499	.851

If someone could explain what makes these guys different, I would really appreciate it.

What’s that you say? Home run titles, all-star appearances, stuff like that? Okay, let’s take a look:

	Colavito	Howard
All-Star Appearances	6	4
Top-10 MVP Finishes	4	4
Rookie of the Year	No	Yes
Home Run Titles	1	2
RBI Titles	1	1
Other Hitting Titles	7	5
World Championships	0	1
Playoff Appearances	0	1

Well, I guess two extra All-Star games and one more extra-base hit and times-on-base title MIGHT equate to an extra homer title, a Rookie of the Year Award and a World Championship, but I’m having a hard time seeing it. Who knows? Maybe Colavito’s world-renowned mediocre corner outfield defense put him over the top. That’s as good a guess as any.

The reality is that there is no good reason for one of these guys to be on this ballot without the other, but this is the yearly insanity ritual we must live with when the BBWAA is involved.

Kinda sickening, isn’t it?

Case Study - Gerry Fraley

I’d like to pose a question. Let’s say you, as a knowledgeable baseball fan, are given the opportunity to put ten additional players in to the Hall of Fame. They can be anyone who is currently eligible for consideration either by the BBWAA or by the Historical Overview Committee, i.e. the Veterans Committee. Who would you choose?

This should be a really fun exercise, and because it is, baseball columnists everywhere regularly present their views on this kind of subject. They find themselves in the doldrums of the sports year, somewhere between bowl season and March Madness, and column ideas are few and far between. And, being BBWAA members, they start to get a jones for something related to the nation’s pastime. So a thought stirs in their minds, generally prompted by the announcement of the new year’s Hall of Fame class, and they decide to put together their own personal list of players who have been wrongfully excluded. They crack out the same column from the previous year, or the year before that, and they rework it into something that could be viewed as fresh.

Let’s explore one of these, just to see if the BBWAA member in question knows what the hell he’s talking about. There were a few candidates to pick from this year, but I settled on Gerry Fraley. Just after the beginning of this year, Fraley wrote a column that appeared in The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, though it appears he doesn’t work for that newspaper. In fact, I’m having a hard time finding any current newspaper that Fraley works for. He was once listed as a columnist for The Dallas Morning News, but his most recent work in that newspaper was all related to hockey games and identified him as a freelance writer based in St. Louis. In other words, he’s currently unemployed. Seems like just the guy to be voting on the baseball Hall of Fame, doesn’t he?

Anyway, Fraley decided to put together his own personal list of the ten former baseball players who are most deserving of being inducted into the Hall of Fame. Here’s his list:

Gavvy Cravath
Tony Oliva
Goose Gossage
Jim Kaat
Jim Rice
Ron Santo
Albert Belle
Gil Hodges
Andre Dawson
Roger Maris

Now, I’m going to be charitable and presume that Fraley developed this list with the assumption that Cal Ripken and Tony Gwynn were going to be elected this year, which explains why they’re not on this list. And I will also be charitable in granting him Gossage, Rice and Santo, the first two because they are currently the top two returning vote-getters among his BBWAA brethren, and Santo because he really is just about the best player not currently enshrined.

But that’s where my charity ends. Given the wide open parameters Fraley set up for himself, I find it hard to believe that any knowledgeable baseball fan, let alone a Hall of Fame voter, would be foolish enough to develop this list of players as representing the best ten baseball players who are eligible for consideration. Just off the top of my head I came up with this comparison:

	W	L	PCT	IP	H	R	ER	BB	SO	ERA	WHIP
Kaat	283	237	.544	4530.3	4620	2038	1738	1083	2461	3.45	1.259
Blyleven	287	250	.534	4970.0	4632	2029	1830	1322	3701	3.31	1.198

Basically, in fewer years in the big leagues, Bert Blyleven won more games, made more starts, pitched more innings, stuck out 50% more batters, threw twice as many shutouts, allowed fewer base runners per inning and posted a lower raw ERA and lower ERA compared to the leagues he pitched in than Jim Kaat did. Blyleven was a much better post-season pitcher as well, posting a career mark of 5-1 with a 2.47 ERA in a post-season career that included two World Championships, compared to Kaat’s career marks of 1-3, 4.01 ERA and one World Championship. If I go to the trouble of neutralizing their respective stats, the gap between Blyleven and Kaat grows even wider:

	W	L	PCT	IP	H	R	ER	BB	SO	ERA	WHIP
Kaat	264	223	.542	4514.6	4800	2061	1854	1124	2437	3.70	1.312
Blyleven	324	228	.587	5062.6	4779	2110	1898	1361	3764	3.37	1.213

In short, Blyleven was a vastly better pitcher, but for some reason Fraley thinks he doesn’t deserve to be in the Hall of Fame more than Jim Kaat does. Why? Beats the hell out of me. His official answer for why Kaat deserves to be in the Hall is this:

“Devotion to his team probably kept Kaat from winning 300 games. He had 272
wins when Cards manager Whitey Herzog asked him to go into the bullpen in 1981.
Kaat made 124 relief appearances over the next three seasons but earned only 11
more wins. Kaat ranks among the top 30 in career wins, innings and stars.”

Well, we can throw that last sentence out because Blyleven ranks ahead of Kaat in wins, innings and starts, so that’s obviously not the reason why Fraley chose Kaat over him. Does the first part of his argument hold any water? No, it doesn’t. Not only was Kaat never a regular starting pitcher with the Cardinals, as Fraley implies, but he hadn’t been a regular starting pitcher since 1978, two years before he ever joined the Cardinals. He spent 1979 making 41 relief appearances and just two starts in time split between the Phillies and Yankees, and he made just 14 starts compared to 35 relief appearances for the Cardinals in 1980 after being dealt from the Yankees. If you look at Kaat’s splits that season, is easy to see that he still had no business starting regularly in the big leagues. His ERA as a starter that year was 4.12 in a league that averaged 3.72, while his ERA as a reliever was 3.60. Both his strikeout rate and his WHIP were better as a reliever than as a starter.

This was just the continuation of a trend that had already been in place for a while. The reason Kaat had been moved to the bullpen in 1979 was because he just wasn’t all that good as a starter anymore. In 1978 he made 24 starts for the Phillies but threw only 140 innings and posted an ERA of 4.10, 13% below the league average of 3.58. The prior year, 1977, he was even worse, going 6-11 in 35 games, 27 of them starts, throwing just 160 innings and posting an ERA of 5.39, which was 26% worse than the league mark of 3.99. Kaat won the grand total of 26 ballgames in his final three years as a starting pitcher. Even if we presume he would have somehow managed to match that mark while with the Cardinals, that’s only 15 wins more than what he actually posted. That gets him to 298, not 300, and I’ve yet to take into account the fact that Kaat was in his early 40s in those years and had already proven that he could no longer be an effective starting pitcher. If anything, the move to the bullpen probably lengthened Kaat’s career, and therefore his win total, rather than artificially suppress it as Fraley claims.

Beyond this poor history on Fraley’s part, he apparently has no concern at all for the context in which Kaat’s numbers were compiled. As we’ve seen in the neutralized stats for both pitchers, Kaat’s career ERA of 3.45 was the functional equivalent of a 3.70 ERA in a neutral run-scoring context. For his career, his ERA was only 7% better than the leagues he pitched in (compared to 19% for Blyleven), and this is despite a move to the bullpen, where lower ERAs are the norm. Fraley doesn’t make any attempt to account for this, nor does he bother to explore any other starting pitchers whose career numbers are better than Kaat’s. If he had, it would have been obvious that Blyleven was a superior pitcher, in nearly every way but fielding, and he would have uncovered a rather lengthy list of other starters who had careers that were at least as impressive, if not more so, than Kaat’s. For instance, here are the neutralized numbers of Kaat and a few guys I found in about ten minutes of scanning through Baseball-Reference.com:

	W	L	PCT	IP	H	R	ER	BB	SO	ERA	WHIP
Kaat	264	223	.542	4514.6	4800	2061	1854	1124	2437	3.70	1.312
T. John	286	228	.556	4725.0	5019	2101	1890	1326	2235	3.60	1.343
L.Tiant	223	157	.587	3501.6	3179	1488	1341	1151	2412	3.45	1.237
B. Pierce	221	149	.597	3421.0	3121	1397	1261	1223	2070	3.32	1.270
M. Harder	237	163	.593	3676.6	3696	1529	1377	1126	1246	3.37	1.312
D. Phillippe	214	94	.695	2826.6	2794	936	843	398	1006	2.68	1.129
S. Leever	217	92	.702	2849.6	2723	917	826	648	916	2.61	1.183

And don’t even get me started on Tony Mullane:

	W	L	PCT	IP	H	R	ER	BB	SO	ERA	WHIP
Mullane	554	158	.778	6449.6	4966	1699	1528	1564	2566	2.13	1.012

Fraley’s blatant lack of research didn’t stop with his misplaced attachment to Jim Kaat. Nearly everyone else on his list is easily surpassed by one or more eligible players at the same position. So you think Gavvy Cravath should be in the Hall of Fame, Mr. Fraley? Well, then what about Babe Herman?

	G	AB	R	H	2B	3B	HR	RBI	BB	SB	AVG	OBP	SLG	OPS
Cravath	1320	4366	696	1311	270	95	137	866	659	102	.300	.396	.500	.896
Herman	1634	5827	873	1843	403	111	182	995	529	93	.316	.374	.517	.891

(Note: These are neutralized career numbers.)

And Gil Hodges should go in? What makes him any more special than Norm Cash or Boog Powell?

	G	AB	R	H	2B	3B	HR	RBI	BB	SB	AVG	OBP	SLG	OPS
Hodges	2163	7279	1098	1943	298	48	374	1266	959	63	.267	.352	.475	.827
Cash	2099	6811	1119	1905	250	41	392	1184	1083	43	.280	.383	.501	.884
Powell	2059	6875	1014	1930	293	11	369	1354	1090	22	.281	.378	.488	.866

The answer, of course, is absolutely nothing. Or at least, nothing objective. The reasons for these assessments by Fraley rest solely in his own mind, and unfortunately he’s representative of a very large percentage of BBWAA voters.

I’m sorry, that’s simply not good enough. I don’t want to hear your gut feeling, or your 20-year old memories, or your half-assed “research”. I want you to actually earn the right to cast your vote. The kind of crap Gerry Fraley foisted upon us simply doesn’t cut it, and I don’t think it’s asking too much of these guys that they actually break a sweat.